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I 
One of the major recurring themes in the literature 
on suicide is that of the desirability of a more nearly 
neutral definition of the concept. And despite the 
numerous disagreements over the various aspects of 
suicide, many of the combatants agree that a more 
nearly value-free explication of the concept would not 
only serve to clarify the nature of suicide, but also 
enhance the subsequent moral considerations of suicide. 
In fact, there seems to be a consensus that most of the 
moral issues related, to suicide could be handled with 
some ease if only there were a morally-neutral 
definition of suicide. Or in other words, the moral 
conflicts over suicide which currently exist would be 
virtually eliminated if we could start with a morally-
neutral definition of suicide. 
One of the most recent exponents of this theme is 
Tom L. Beauchamp in his "What is Suicide?" . Mindful 
that since "significantly different moral, social, and 
legal sanctions will be implied by the classification 
of an act as suicide . . . the development of an 
adequate definition will have important practical 
consequences." Beauchamp argues towards a definition 
of suicide thought to be relatively free of moral 
prejudice. His "point is that we would be better off 
in discussing the moral justification of suicide if we 
had a more neutral concept than we in fact have." 
In this essay, I will offer an alternative, 
stipulative definition to that of Beauchamp's, such 
that it not only will eliminate the controversial cases 
that Beauchamp's definition has trouble with, but also, 
is meant to increase the moral neutrality of the 
concept of suicide. Then I will argue that having such 
a definition (mine or anyone else's) is, contrary to 
Beauchamp's belief, of little value—for by being 
morally neutral, the definition loses the very quality 
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which initially prompted us to give the concept of 
suicide so much of our attention. 
II 
Beauchamp's analysis concentrates primarily on two 
classes of problems associated with suicide, treatment 
refusal and sacrificial death. He argues that the 
former class of bringing about your own death is not 
necessarily suicide, and that the latter class is not 
necessarily non-suicide. The first class involves 
passive means to death, and even though one might 
desire his own death, "the 'cide' part of 'suicide 1 
entails 'killingl, which is commonly contrasted with 
allowing to die." As for sacrificial deaths, many are 
not suicides, though not for the traditional reason 
that the act is other-regarding, as distinct from self-
regarding. On the contrary, Beauchamp maintains that 
such a distinction is irrelevant, since "in such cases 
it cannot be said that he brings about the life-
threatening conditions causing his death in order to 
cause his death." Similar to the "active/passive" 
distinction applying to refusal of treatment cases, the 
important distinction for sacrificial death cases is 
the "caused by/caused to" distinction. 
Beauchamp cites the famous case of Captain Oates as 
a clear instance of sacrificial suicide. Oates, 
realizing that he was suffering from an illness that 
hindered the progress of a party attempting to make its 
way out of a severe blizzard, walks into the Antarctic 
cold to die. Interestingly, not everyone would agree 
with Beauchamp's judgment of this case. For example, 
R. F. Holland maintains that Oates did not commit 
suicide," . . . the blizzard killed him. Had Oates 
taken out a revolver and shot himself I should have 
agreed he was a suicide." However, Holland does not 
claim that in the case of Socrates "the hemlock killed 
him." Yet what is pertinent is that while Beauchamp 
and Holland agree, for different reasons, that Socrates 
was not a suicide, R. G. Frey claims the contrary. 
Frey maintains that Socrates was neither forced to 
drink the poison nor was he under duress: "he drank 
the hemlock knowingly, not unknowingly or in ignorance 
of what it was or what its effects on him would be, and 
intentionally, not accidentally or mistakenly." 
Another controversial case is that of the Buddhist monk 
who sets fire to himself in order to protest the war. 
Joseph Margolis argues that "if an agent is presumed 
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rational, then if he takes his own life or allows it to 
be taken for some further purpose that he serves 
instrumentglly, then we normally refuse to say he has 
suicided." Beauchamp disagrees and insists that the 
Buddhist monk is a suicide. Whether one kills himself 
instrumentally in order to achieve some ulterior 
objective is, for Beauchamp, beside the point. Rather, 
the crucial issue is "whether death is caused by one's 
own arrangement of the life-threatening conditions 
causing Q death for the purpose of bringing about 
death." y 
Despite the obvious conflicting views on what 
constitutes suicide, Beauchamp boldly offers his 
definition: 
An act is a suicide if a person intentionally 
brings about his own death in circumstances where 
others do not coerce him to the action, except in 
those cases where death occurs through an agent's 
intentional decision but is caused by conditions 
not specifically arranged by the agent 1(J[or the 
purpose of bringing about his own death. 
At this point what is important is not Beauchamp's 
definition, but rather the unresolved controversies 
over what is a suicide. Note that the disagreement 
between Beauchamp and Holland is over whether Oates 
killed himself or was killed by the blizzard. As for 
Beauchamp and Frey, Frey maintains that Socrates was 
not coerced and therefore was a suicide, while 
Beauchamp maintains that since Socrates' death was 
decreed by others, then it was not a suicide. Finally, 
Beauchamp and Margolis disagree as to the relevance of 
arranging your own death as opposed to using your own 
death to serve some other purpose. 
I suggest (also boldly) that these controversies 
can be substantially resolved by employing a relatively 
stricter definition of suicide than those supplied by 
our disputants. And as surprising as it might be, the 
core of the new stipulative definition will come from 
Beauchamp's own analysis. On at least two occasions, 
Beauchamp specifically argues that a given case is not 
a suicide because the.person did not kill himself "in 
order that he die." However, there appears to be a 
major inconsistency, for on other occasions (the 
Buddhist monk case for example) Beauchamp discounts the 
relevance of one bringing about his own death as a 
means to serve some ulterior objective. Yet to play 
down or ignore the role and objective of one's 
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intention in killing oneself goes contrary to virtually 
every theory of suicide. In fact, one of Beauchamp's 
early steps for his later definition is that a person 
is a suicide only if "the person's own death is 
intentionally self-caused." But the issue is whether 
Beauchamp means that the agent must have as his 
objective the sole and final goal of his own death, or 
whether Beauchamp would allow the agent's intention to 
be that of bringing about his own death in order to 
achieve some ulterior objective. In view of 
Beauchamp*s apparent equivocation or ambiguity on this 
matter, I will opt for the former as the more 
defensible requirement for an act of taking one's own 
life to be considered a suicide. 
To take seriously as one of the conditions 
necessary for suicide that one's intention is directed 
towards the sole and final objective of bringing about 
one's own death has the immediate effect of restricting 
suicide proper to those few cases in which the agent 
has no purpose he wishes to achieve other than his own 
death. Accordingly, someone who takes his own life in 
order to, for example, be rid of a specific physical or 
psychological state which is judged unbearable or 
foolish to endure, is not a suicide, for his death was 
used to achieve an objective which is only causally 
related to his killing himself, not logically identical 
to killing himself. Or, from another perspective, we 
should recognize the difference between the cessation 
of a particular (type of) experience, for example, pain 
or anguish, and the cessation of all experiences. 
Granted, if one brings about the absence of all 
experiences, there would be no particular experiences. 
Yet, in terms of intentions, often only some particular 
instance of the latter is desired, and the former is 
seen as merely a causal means towards its achievement. 
Consider the following formulation of the 
intentional condition for an act of taking one's own 
life to be suicide proper: 
The person's act of taking his own life was 
motivated solely by the desire to end all 
physical and psychological experiences. As such, 
the person was of such a frame of mind that no 
conceivable alteration in the possible 
consequences of the act would have been 
sufficient to dissuade the person from taking his 
own life. Accordingly, the act was not performed 
for the sake of anything other than the cessation 
of all his experiences. 
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The essential element is that no conceivable change in 
the possible results of the person's suicide would have 
been sufficient to alter his desire to take his own 
life. This means that the difference between a non-
suicide instance of taking one's own life and suicide 
proper is that only in the former case would an agent 
change his mind about killing himself if convinced that 
the expected specific consequences of bringing about 
his own death would not obtain or would be other than 
expected. For example, one who is set on killing 
himself in order to produce a sense of guilt with his 
family, would not actually take his own life if he had 
reasons to believe that such a result would not follow 
from his act. Equally, if Captain Oates could have 
been convinced that his death would not increase the 
likelihood of his colleagues' survival, he would not 
have gone to his death. And the Buddhist monk would 
not have set fire to himself if he could have been 
convinced that no one would see his killing himself as 
an act of protest. Finally, since Socrates did not 
drink the hemlock in order to die, he was not a 
suicide. 
Given this restriction, one might wonder if there 
can be any instances of suicide proper. I offer the 
case of George Sanders, the British actor, as one which 
satisfies the intentional condition for suicide proper. 
Sanders left a letter explaining that he had no 
insurmountable physical or psychological problems, no 
goal which he hoped his death would fulfill, no purpose 
sought other than no longer to have any experiences, 
for he had found that all experiences were boring and 
meaningless. Yet Sanders insisted that he was neither 
sad nor mad; he merely wanted release from the 
prospects of having any future experiences. Clearly, 
in this case there would have been no room for 
maneuvering the possible consequences (or lack of them) 
in such a way to dissuade Sanders from suicide. The 
consequences were irrelevant, for his death was not to 
be a means to anything else. In Beauchamp's terms, 
Sanders' act should be seen as an indisputable instance 
of "causing his death in order that he die." This is 
what I have termed suicide proper. 
Two related criticisms might be registered. First, 
that in Sanders' case, he was obviously suffering from 
boredom, and therefore, contrary to my claim, he 
actually took his own life in order to be rid of a 
specific (type of) experience. Yet this criticism 
ignores the distinction made earlier between the 
cessation of a specific (type of) experience and the 
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cessation of all experiences. Sanders' intention was 
directed towards the latter, not the former. If, 
however, one insists upon pushing the criticism, then I 
would grant that to the extent that boredom (or any 
other general psychological state) can occur only when 
specifically characterized by a distinct object of 
reference, then to that degree Sanders (or any other 
suicide) was seeking to use his own death as a means to 
alter a psychological state. Unfortunately, one 
consequence of pushing the thesis this far is that it 
ultimately renders it impossible for anyone ever to 
take his own life for non-instrumental reasons. In 
other words, by insisting upon a reinterpretation of 
Sanders' intention so that he killed himself in order 
to bring about some ulterior objective, any possibility 
of someone killing himself in order to die, has been 
eliminated. Clearly, such a move has dubious value in 
any attempt at clarifying the concept of suicide. 
Another unfortunate consequence of pushing this 
reinterpretation of Sanders' suicide is that if it is 
impossible ever to have a case of non-instrumental 
taking of one's own life, then there is equally no 
possibility of ever offering a value-free explication 
of suicide, for as long as an agent's intention is 
directed towards something other than his own death, 
then that something other will impose value 
characteristics upon the agent's act of taking his own 
life. That is to say, if my analysis is correct, then 
the most promising method for achieving a value-free 
explication of suicide is by restricting the agent's 
intention to the sole objective of killing himself. 
Once other intentions are allowed, then they bring with 
them the very value characteristics we initially sought 
to neutralize. 
The second possible criticism is that Sanders was 
not really locked into his decision such that no change 
in the expected consequences would have altered his 
course of action, for what if he became convinced that 
even if he kills himself, he would still have boring 
experiences? Granted, if Sanders had been so 
convinced, than he would not have taken his own life. 
Yet, I do not take this admission to be a reversal or 
concession on my part. What must be realized is that 
while it is psychologically, and therefore logically 
possible to have experiences without boredom it is 
neither psychologically nor logically possible to 
experience boredom, while having no experiences. And 
if Sanders' death is logically co-extensive with the 
cessation of all his experiences, then still being 
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bored after one's death is logically impossible. 
Accordingly, it seems safe to assume that anyone who 
intends to kill himself in order to be rid of all 
experiences, does not expect to have experiences after 
he is dead. 
The primary rationale for this stipulative 
intentional condition for suicide proper has been a 
guest for consistency. For many people, cases of 
sacrifice are not suicides, because of the instrumental 
factor. It would seem to follow that in the case of a 
person taking his own life, for example, in order to be 
rid of pain or anguish, it should equally be judged not 
a suicide, for such a case also involves the 
instrumental factor of doing X (taking one's own life) 
in order to achieve Y (the absence of pain or anguish). 
To appreciate this claim requires that a distinction be 
kept between the achievement or cessation of a 
particular (type of) experience, be it one's own or 
another's, and the cessation of all of one's 
experiences. Only when the latter is sought for its 
own sake do we have an instance of suicide proper. On 
this point, Beauchamp was conspicuously inconsistent— 
for while he uses the presence of the instrumental 
factor as the reason a given case is not a suicide, his 
definition of suicide is ambiguous as to the possible 
relevance of whether one's.death, to be suicide, has to 
be sought for itself only. 
Ill 
In this section I wish to examine critically the 
notion that to the degree that one is able to start 
with a morally-neutral concept of suicide, then to that 
extent one can expect subsequent success in unravelling 
the complex moral issue associated with suicide. I 
have tried to offer such a morally-neutral under-
standing of suicide. Whether it is accepted as such is 
not pertinent to this section, for it is the general 
notion that it would be beneficial to have such a 
concept that will be at issue. 
For an act description to be morally-neutral is to 
be characterized in such a way that the act's possible 
rightness or wrongness depends upon additional informa-
tion. For example, stating what is not the case is a 
non-moral or morally-neutral specification of an act, 
while lying is a moral specification of an act and 
accordingly we do not need additional information to 
establish the act's prima facie wrongness. In like 
manner, if suicide is defined in a morally-neutral way, 
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then given that characterization, suicide proper would 
be neither right, wrong, nor permissible (if 
permissible is distinct from right), nor would it be 
prohibited (if prohibited is distinct from wrong). In 
other words, we go outside the act description or 
identification in order to determine suicide's moral 
status and worth. Yet where is this outside and of 
what does it consist? Certainly it cannot be the 
intention of the agent, for that is already an element 
in our neutral definition of suicide: the cessation of 
all of one's experiences. Furthermore, as was argued 
earlier, if we allow the concept of suicide to include 
the possibility of an agent's intention being directed 
towards something other than his own death, then that 
something other will most likely impose value 
characteristics upon the agent's act of taking his own 
life. And then we would not have a morally-neutral 
description of suicide. The point is that we cannot 
have it both ways; an initial morally-neutral 
description of suicide involving the agent's sole 
intention to terminate all experiences, and a 
subsequent moral evaluation of the agent's intention, 
of which his suicide was merely to serve as a means. 
In other words, an agent's intention for taking his own 
life cannot be solely non-instrumental and also 
directed towards some goal other than his own death. 
In view of how an analysis of the agent's intention 
will not yield a determination of suicide's moral 
status and worth, then the other possibility is the 
consequences of the act. Yet the immediate and direct 
consequences of the agent's act is the fulfillment of 
his intention, the cessation of all his experiences. 
But what of other consequences, what of the more remote 
consequences? To suggest this direction of analysis is 
to be primarily concerned with certain moral principles 
(for example, the utilitarian principle) and only 
incidentally with suicide. Accordingly, what gives 
suicide its moral status and worth, on this model are 
principles which are established quite independently of 
any analysis or characterization of suicide. As such, 
it is difficult to understand how the many 
controversies over whether certain acts were acts of 
suicide (for example, those dealt with in the first 
section of this article) have any bearing on the 
subsequent and independent judgment of the moral status 
and worth of suicide. The point is that the different 
views on suicide experssed by Beauchamp, Holland, Frey, 
and Margolis are apparently not moral disagreements nor 
grounded in moral disagreements. Rather, they seem to 
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differ on whether a given example was or was not an 
instance of suicide. If that is the case, then 
contrary to the expectations of Beauchamp and others, 
the disagreements over identifying instances of suicide 
are not of such a nature that a more morally-neutral 
characterization of suicide would abolish or rectify, 
for the model that Beauchamp and others have been 
assuming is one which places moral considerations of 
suicide outside of the domain of analyzing and 
identifying suicide. As such, the moral issue of under 
what circumstance, if any, is it justified to operate 
from solely self-serving intentions (for example, when, 
if ever, is it justified to take your own life for non-
instrumental reasons) is quite an independent issue 
from that of analyzing and identifying an act of 
suicide. Therefore, to use the remote consequences of 
suicide to determine the moral status and worth of 
suicide, is to use a model which is in direct 
contradiction with the explanation offered by Beauchamp 
and others for the many disagreements over what 
constitutes an act of suicide. 
Where then does this leave us? Is there no way 
successfully to distinguish a morally-neutral concept 
of suicide from moral evaluations of suicide? Perhaps 
the makings of a solution are hinted at in the prior 
reference to the difference between stating what is not 
the case and lying. And I suggest that for our purpose 
the importance is in the distinction between a more 
general as compared to a more specific act description. 
As such the more general (stating what is not the case) 
can accommodate a greater number as well as variety of 
instances than can the more specific (lying) act 
description. Yet, as we previously discovered, the 
general act description is also the morally-neutral 
characterization. Therefore, one way to distinguish 
suicide proper from a moral evaluation of it is by 
defining suicide in terms of a general act description. 
Now the most obvious move would be to define suicide as 
either the taking of one's own life or the bringing 
about of one's own death. But due to the lack of any 
further specifications, this would allow for not only 
certain accidental deaths to be labeled suicides, but 
also it ignores the important distinction between 
instrumental and non-instrumental acts of killing 
oneself. To correct these two faults our definition 
must be made more precise, more specific. However this 
is where and how we ran into trouble before, for each 
of the disputants had their own set of conditions for 
what makes an act of taking one's own life a suicide. 
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Also, at this level we were told that the competing 
concepts of suicide were too value-laden, not morally-
neutral enough. This was then rectified by the 
stipulative definition of suicide which required that 
the act of killing oneself be solely for the sake of 
terminating all of one's experiences. Therefore, we 
once again have a morally-neutral definition, but this 
time in terms of a very specific act description. 
Now let us examine what we have to give up or 
assume in order to achieve this new morally-neutral 
concept of suicide, and determine whether it is really 
any more serviceable than the overly general concept of 
suicide as killing oneself. First of all, even to 
request, not to mention achieve, a morally-neutral 
conception of suicide presupposes some form of the 
fact/value dichotomy. According to those who hold to 
such a bifurcation, issues of truth and falsity are 
restricted to the former realm, while value considera-
tions must make it independent of any epistemological 
standards. Extended, this theory would have us believe 
that there are basically three sorts of 
categorizations: purely factual (e.g., swans cannot 
fly); purely evaluative (e.g., swans are beautiful); 
and evaluation based on factual beliefs (e.g., swans do 
not make good pets). Now to request a morally-neutral 
description of suicide is to say that we should strip 
away all evaluations previously associated with the 
concept, leaving the purely factual characteristics. 
Yet does this request make sense? Consider the so-
called value-neutral concept of truth. Truth is 
considered value-neutral because it is said to be 
restricted to the factual realm. To be value-neutral, 
as I understand it, would be to lack any general type 
of good or bad characteristics. Therefore, apparently 
the characteristic of being superior to falsehood 
should be seen as merely a non-essential, evaluative 
addition to the concept of truth. That is, allegedly, 
truth can be fully and properly characterized without 
any reference to being superior to ,or better than 
falsehood. I find this analysis absurd. 
Consider another example. Peter Goldstone in his 
response to Daniel Pekarsky's paper on education and 
manipulation, argues that the debate over what a person 
is, 
. . is not to be settled by an analysis of the 
common sense notion of a person, for the criteria 
implicit in the use of that term do not incline 
us persuasively in one direction or the other. 
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The debate over what a person is, is not a debate 
that exists independently of substantive moral 
judgments, rather the moral judgments one is 
prepared to make are part of the debate over what 
a person is. 
Furthermore, consider the relationship between 
abstracting and rendering a concept morally-neutral. 
R. G. Collingwood argues that nothing exists nor is 
intelligible in isolation. Specifically, 
. . . one cannot abstract without falsifying. To 
think apart of things that are together is to 
think of them as they are not, and to plead that 
this initial severance makes no essential 
difference to their inner nature gis only to erect 
falsification into a principle. 
The lesson is to be learned from Collingwood is that to 
the extent that one removes a concept from its normal 
context, to that degree one has distorted the meaning 
and status of the concept. Finally, H. I. Brown has 
made the same point as Collingwood in his treatment of 
being rational. Substituting 'suicide' for 'rational' 
the argument is that suicide is "a concept that does 
not exist in isolation, but is intimately linked 2 Qto a 
variety of other concepts in a Quinean net", such 
that to judge a given act as a suicide is to make a 
claim that not only presupposes certain fundamental 
principles, but also has serious consequences for our 
understanding of human conduct. 
Addressing the same issue from still another 
perspective, Hyland reminds us that 
. when a Catholic says that X has committed 
suicide he is not making a purely factual 
statement. The statement is already imbued with 
moral significance to the effect that, within the 
Catholic community, suicide is considered to be 
morally wrong. 
And this is not an isolated example nor is it unique to 
certain points of view. Gellner observes that 
"fundamental moral approval is constitutive of this, 
that or the other conceptualisation (in e f f e c t — 
construction) of the world 2 2and thus is welded to the 
objects it has constructed." Stated quite succinctly 
the point is that "the most important moraloissues are 
prejudged by the time we identify objects." 
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What I take to be common to these arguments and 
observations is that more often than not the very 
reason we sense a need to attempt a so-called value-
free explication of a given concept is exactly why such 
an explication is not possible. That is to say, it is 
due to their being moral-laden that certain concepts 
initially prompt our need for and desire to clarify 
them; and then in our misguided method of clarification 
we attempt to rid these concepts of the very moral 
characteristics which initiated our inquiry. It is not 
realizing this methodological flaw that accounts for 
Beauchamp and others questing after the neutrality of 
moral-laden concepts. The crucial point is to 
appreciate that the vast majority of concepts that are 
germane to value and moral issues cannot be 
successfully or properly explicated in neutral terms, 
for all such attempts require the falsifying procedure 
of abstracting. Furthermore, all attempts at a 
neutral-analysis of moral-laden concepts result either 
in failure or in a empty notion: while such an attempt 
is unsuccessful if the concept retains value or value 
related characteristics, an attempt yields an empty 
notion to the extent that it is so general (e.g., 
suicide as killing oneself) or so so specific (e.g., 
suicide as the intentional taking of one's life solely 
for the sake of dying) that there is nothing left to 
which value considerations can be applied. 
As the final (and yet perhaps principal) reason for 
insisting that the concept of suicide is moral-laden, 
consider the impossibility of neutralizing or 
eliminating the ethical aspect of whether, and to what 
degree, there is a ground for respecting human life 
(or, if preferred, whether, and to what extent, there 
is a right to human life). The point is that the issue 
of respect for (or right of) human life is an ethical 
issue, and as such, any act of taking a human life, for 
example, suicide, is a matter which clearly falls 
within the domain of ethics. 
The above analysis produces a dilemma. Either one 
is successful or not successful in formulating a 
netural explication of the concept of suicide. If one 
is successful, then there is nothing available to which 
we can attach moral considerations. On the contrary, 
if one is able morally to consider the concept of 
suicide, it is because the concept has not been 
rendered neutral. Therefore, Beauchamp and others must 
decide exactly what warrants their undivided attention: 
either formulating a neutral explication of suicide, 
which will lack both actual and potential moral 
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significance, or dealing with the moral considerations 
of suicide which can be done only in an existing moral 
context. 
44 
NOTES 
1. Tora L. Beauchamp, "What is Suicide?," in Ethical 
Issues in Death and Dying, Tom L. Beauchamp and Seymour 
Pepline, eds., (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 
1978). 
2 
Beauchamp, p. 97f. 
3 
Beauchamp, p. 97. 
4 
Beauchamp, p. 99. 
5Beauchamp, p. 100. 
c 
R. F. Holland, "Suicide," in Moral Problems, 2nd 
ed., James Rachels, ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 
1975), p. 395. 7 . . . R. G. Frey, "Did Socrates Commit Suicide?," 
Philosophy, vol. 53 (January 1978), p. 106. 
g 
Joseph Margolis, Negativities: The Limits of Life 
(Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill, 1975), p. 28. 
9 
Beauchamp, p. 101. 
i 0Beauchamp, p. 101. 
l ABeauchamp, pp. 100, 101. 
12 
Beauchamp, p. 98. In support of this 
orientation, Edwin Schneidman has argued that our 
existing fourfold classification of deaths into 
homicide, accident, natural, and suicide is over-
simplified and inaccurate. Specifically, in reference 
to suicide, the classification is "too confusing, 
primarily because the psychological factors—the 
individual's intentions, his motivations, and his role 
in his own demise—are omitted." Accordingly, what is 
45 
needed is "a classification of death phenomena focused 
on the individual's role in his own demise." Edwin 
Schneidman, "Suicide as a Taboo Topic," The Psychology 
of Suicide (New York: Science House, 1970), p. 545. 
13 
Beauchamp, p. 101. 
14 
For another version of this problem see Bruce B. 
Suttle's "Neautralizing Positive and Negative Duties," 
unpublished. 
1 5 I t could be mentioned that in this context I am 
assuming that if living can be taken as an end-in-
itself, as many have argued, then so can one's own 
death. Related to this, see Bruce B. Suttle's "A 
Difference in Killing or the Killing of the 
Difference?," under consideration by Ethics. 
1 6Julius Kovesi, Moral Notions (New York: 
Humanities Press, 1977), p. 128. Also see J. M. 
Brennan, The Open-Texture of Moral Concepts (London: 
Macmillan, 1977). 
17 
What is being alluded to is the doctrine of the 
ethics of belief. For another version of the normative 
character of truth, see "Truth as Authenticity" in 
Dorothy Walsh's Literature and Knowledge (Middleton, 
CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1969) 
18 
Peter Goldstone, "Response to Pekarsky," 
Philosophy of Education, 1977: Proceedings of the 
Philosophy of Education Society (Urbana, IL: 
Educational Theory, 1977), p. 369. 
19 
R. G. Collingwood, Speculum Mentis or The Map of 
Knowledge (London: Oxford University Press, 1924), p. 
160. 
20 
Harold I. Brown, "On Being Rational," American 
Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 15 (October 1978), p. 
242. 
21 
John T. Hyland, "Moral Reasoning and Moral 
Education," Journal of Moral Education, vol. 6 (January 
1977), p. 77. Also see R. W. Beardsmore, Moral 
Reasoning (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), 
pp. 72-77, 95ff. 
46 
"Ernest Gellner, Legitimation of Belief 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 41. 
2 3Gellner, p. 44. 
24 
For an illustration of the former, see Bruce B. 
Suttle's "The Identity Crisis in Philosophy of 
Education," Educational Theory, vol. 24, (Summer 1974). 
And for an illustration of the latter, see Bruce B. 
Suttle's "Actions and Consequences," Journal of 
Critical Analysis, vol. 4, (1972). 
25 . 
William K. Frankena, "The Ethics of Respect for 
Life," in Respect for Life in Medicine, Philosophy, and 
the Law, Stephan F. Barker, e<T (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1976). 
